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Abstract. The financial and economic global crisis has exacerbated some of the imbalances existent 
in all EU Member States, in particular the fiscal-budgetary imbalances. For some countries whose 
currency is euro, the fiscal and budgetary challenges seem to threaten even the stability of the euro 
area. Thus, in the context of financial and economic global crisis, this article aims at identifying a 
number of negative aspects of the fiscal-budgetary situation of some euro area countries, more 
seriously affected (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, Spain) and at revealing a series of possible 
implications of this phenomenon for Romania, thus giving originality of the conducted analysis. A 
fulcrum in this approach is the economic literature and the authors’ research work in the field of 
European integration. Through a comparative approach, the authors have identified some weaknesses 
of the Romanian economy generated by the current situation of some euro area countries. Given the 
place of the theme within the frame of present interest researches, the article’s results will be of 
interest for both academics and practitioners. 
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1. Introduction 
In the present context of the financial and economic global crisis, a “thorny” angle 
of the macroeconomic imbalances is represented, more and more lately, by the 
fiscal-budgetary problem of the EU countries, and especially, of the euro area 
countries. The crisis, the anti-cyclical budget and fiscal measures adopted and the 
national banking systems rescue packages exposed, even more, the euro area 
countries to the risk of exceeding the budgetary limits from the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP). In this respect, it is particularly important for euro area 
countries which have registered excessive deficits to correct them in line with the 
deadlines set by the EU Council, and, after correcting excessive deficits, their 
strengthening is needed in order to become sustainable on the medium and long-
term. Countries like Greece, Italy, Portugal, Ireland and Spain (GIPIS)1 seem not 
so well anchored in the economic and financial architecture of the euro area, 
generating a series of problems for the overall stability of this monetary area. 
Therefore, this article aims at debating the GIPIS countries fiscal-budgetary issue, 
and the possible negative implications for our country. 
 
2. Fiscal-Budgetary Problems – a Comparative Analysis among Some 
Euro Area Countries  
Greece has constantly consistently exceeded the benchmark set in the Maastricht 
Treaty (before and after euro adoption) in both budget deficit and public debt 
criteria, the latest recording its higher growth after 2007 (see Figure 1). Thus, in 
2009 Greece had a 270 billion Euros debt, respectively a 112.6% of GDP debt 
(around 100% of GDP over the period 2002-20082). This has become a serious 
problem under current global financial crisis, when investors began to treat 
differently the debts3 of euro area countries. However, we can see that Greek’s 
problem refers mainly to the state debt, this country having a reasonable private 
debt level, which cannot be said, for instance, about Spain. Fears for Greek’s 
ability to finance and to meet its creditors’ obligations hit severely the financial 
markets in January 2009, when the Athens government announced that the budget 
                                                          
1
 Countries are ranked in descending biggest public debts order. The article is being concerned more 
about public debt slippages. 
2
 AMECO Database 
3
 Currently, Greece’s CDS on sovereign debt is traded around 250, compared with 52 - for Germany, 
62 - for USA, 120 - for the UK, and 178 – for Italy. 
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deficit increased to 12.7% in 20091, more than three times higher than official 
estimates. In these circumstances, Greece is forced to offer yields for its 
government securities approaching 6.5% in order to attract investors, with almost 
four percentage points higher than German government securities. 
 
 
Figure 1. General government consolidated gross debt as a percentage of GDP 
Source: Eurostat and European Commission, European Economic Forecast - 
autumn 2009, European Economy 10/2009 
 
The public debt cost of Greece reached the highest level since the euro introduction 
because of the difficult situation, and also due to the uncertainties that surround the 
public finances of the Greek state. In 2001, immediately after Greece was admitted 
into the European Monetary Union, Goldman Sachs helped the Athens 
government, quietly, to borrow billions. The understanding, hidden from the public 
eyes, helped Athens to meet European standards in terms of deficit, continuing to 
                                                          
1
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spend beyond its means. The agreements concluded in the last 10 years by Wall 
Street banks raise many questions about the role played by Wall Street in the last 
major financial drama in the world. These less correct agreements, similar to those 
which generated the sub-prime mortgage crisis, have led to the widening of Greece 
financial crisis and resulted in undermining the European currency, allowing the 
European governments to hide their growing debts from the "eyes" of budget 
supervisors from Brussels. Derivatives have played an important role in increasing 
Greece debt, just as it happened in the sub-prime crisis in America and in the 
implosion of American International Group (AIG), based on loans in exchange for 
future government payments. Greece, for instance, gave in exchange for this 
money the rights over the fees charged by airports and over the lottery profits1, 
classifying these transactions as sales rather than loans. This type of business has 
stirred controversy in government circles for many years. Since 2000, EU finance 
ministers debated whether derivative transactions using "creative accounting" 
should be made public. Despite the negative response, in 2002, EU bodies required 
the disclosure of business which did not appear in the balance sheets, forcing 
governments to treat them as loans rather than sales. Greece did not see fit to do so, 
because its transactions were made before the amendment of this rule (in 2002). 
Critics argue that, if they are not recorded as loans, such arrangements lead to a 
wrong track both the investors and the regulators regarding the problem of a 
country's debt. Swap agreements, even if they were legal, contributed to the 
increase of instability, creating the impression of a false economic equilibrium. 
Even when the crisis was near its peak, at the end of 2009, the banks were seeking 
ways to help Greece to conceal its debts by using financing instruments that would 
have pushed the debt of this country’s health system in the distant future, in a 
similar way to the completing of the second mortgage, in the case of troubled 
owners from the mortgage market. 
                                                          
1
 These agreements had mythological names:  
Aeolos SA (2001) - a securitization worth 355 million euros, guaranteed by Greece with the airport 
taxes due to Greece by the airlines companies. The business was managed by Morgan Stanley, Alpha 
Bank and EFG Eurobank, according to an article in EuroWeek, 2001. 
Ariadne SA (2000) - a business of 650 million euros, guaranteed by state lottery profits. This business 
was dealt by Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Schroder Salomon Smith Barney, UBS Alpha Bank and 
Commercial Bank, according to an article in EuroWeek, in 2000.  
Atlas Securitization SA (2001) - a business of 2 billion euros guaranteed by European Commission 
payments in a Greece developing plan. This was managed by BNP Paribas, Deutsche Bank, EFG 
Eurobank and NBG International, according to an article in EuroWeek, 2001. 
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High rank European officials, led by the European Commission, decided to work 
closely with the Greek authorities in order to implement concrete measures to 
reduce the budget deficit and the Athens authorities have undertaken specific 
commitments and must report regularly on the progress made, the first time on 
March 16, 2010, the second time in mid May and then, every three months. Greece 
has also agreed to provide additional economic measures, if it will be necessary, in 
order to reduce the budget deficit by four percentage points in 2010 and to end the 
crisis, because the risks, related to macroeconomic developments and market 
evolution, are real. 
In an attempt to force a decision from the euro area partners, Greece announced 
that it considers an appeal to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), if the EU will 
not provide her the needed financial assistance, solution quickly disapproved by 
European Central Bank (ECB) President. While Germany recommends that Greece 
should have a combination of aids from the IMF and EU, as an emergency 
measure, if it will be extremely necessary, France sees the IMF aid, lender with 
headquarters in Washington, as a political humiliation for the euro area. 
On the other hand, Standard & Poor's and Moody's threatens to revise downwards 
the country rating for Greece with one or two steps in a few months due to its high 
budget deficit and to the pressures from the banking sector, if it deviates from its 
austerity plan. The risks over Greece’s economic development will make 
necessary, perhaps, a wider fiscal consolidation, raising questions on the feasibility 
of the budget deficit reduction program. For Greece it is important to have a good 
country rating, because only in these circumstances the ECB will provide 
collaterals for its bonds, guarantees that Greek banks can use in order to obtain 
loans. As the European Central Bank will tighten its rules at the end of the year, 
Greece needs at least an A rating to be eligible. Greek banks have used more 
government securities as collateral, through the European Central Bank, than any 
other country in the euro area, and rely on this form of financing. 
For Greece, there is not a theoretical possibility of country bankruptcy, as the 
European authorities cannot afford to attend helpless to such a global shock wave, 
the country being too important to enter into economic collapse without serious 
consequences for the financial and monetary stability of the euro area. Thus, 
investors’ fears concerning Greece’s ability to refinance its debts have affected 
lately the euro exchange rate, contributing to its depreciation against the U.S. 
dollar. Also, an additional pressure on the euro exchange rate was represented and 
it is still represented by the hedge funds behavior, funds which have made 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                                    No. 2/2010 
 
 10 
significant profits from transactions with securities issued by Greece and which 
have offered insurance against the risk of the Greek state default, further 
complicating Greece’s financial situation. Athens committed to bring the budget 
deficit from 12.7% of GDP in 2009 to below the threshold of 3% of GDP by 2012, 
although official forecasts1 show the maintaining of the deficit at almost the same 
level (see Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 2. Net borrowing/lending of consolidated general government sector as 
a percentage of GDP 
Source: Eurostat and European Commission, European Economic Forecast - 
autumn 2009, European Economy 10/2009 
The fiscal-budgetary imbalance’s problem of the GIPIS states can be translated not 
only into a mismanagement of budget deficits and external debt, but especially into 
a manifestation of asymmetric shocks, that has always been known to be a 
                                                          
1
 AMECO Database and European Commission, European Economic Forecast - autumn 2009, 
European Economy 10/2009. 
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problem, which deepened in the current crisis context. This can be said also about 
Spain.  
The origin of the difficulties that Spain is facing today can be found in real estate 
speculations having taken place for years, which caused huge growth in houses 
prices, attracted large capital inflows and allowed countries like Germany to record 
huge surpluses, while Spain and other "peripheral economies" had deficits. 
Therefore, large capital inflows have increased Spanish demand for goods and 
services, leading to substantially higher inflation than Germany and other countries 
with surpluses, and when "housing bubble" exploded, Spain had an extremely low 
domestic demand, no so competitive compared with the whole euro area as a result 
of the increases in prices and costs of the labor market. As Spain could not 
appreciate the "currency" at the moment of the real estate boom, nor could she 
depreciate it after that time, the country faces now and will face, also, in the future 
the consequences of losing exchange rate flexibility: namely deflation and high 
unemployment, large budget deficits and massive public debt. In order to solve 
these problems, euro area countries should consider all available methods for 
increasing the integration of the taxation/fiscality and labor market.  
For Spain the risk was, along with the loss of monetary policy independence (the 
cost that was felt in time by all countries of the euro area periphery), the 
development of the real estate market at an unsustainable pace. This development 
was stimulated by several factors: low interest rates of ECB compared with higher 
yields in Spain, high rates of growth of disposable income, easier access of 
households credit, population dynamics, with increased flows of immigrants, taxes 
preferential treatment for owners and foreign demand for holiday houses in this 
country. Spain’s experience stresses the existence of a risk of asset markets 
overheating during the convergence process within a currency area. 
Doubts concerning the budgetary situation of Spain and its ability to finance the 
huge deficit recorded (over 11.2% of GDP in 2009, compared with only 4.1% of 
GDP recorded in 2008) creates, as in Greece’s case, tensions on the euro exchange 
rate. The deterioration of the Spanish fiscal outlook is driven by persistent revenue 
deficit, by the strong increase in social spending and by the projected impact of 
cyclical developments. To these aspects, it can be added the discretionary measures 
adopted in 2007-2008, namely: tax reform (2007), a package of incentives (early 
2008), additional incentives (late 2008 and early 2009). 
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In early 2010 Spain announced the implementation of an austerity program, trying 
to show the markets that it will not have the same financial problems as Greece. 
Despite this measure, the Spanish executive had to revise upwards the deficit 
forecasts for 2010-2012. Thus, the forecast for 20101 shows a deficit of 10.1% of 
GDP, in 2011 - 9.3% of GDP and in 2012 - 5.3% of GDP2. Under this program, all 
government spending and policies will be reduced, except for state aid, such as 
unemployment benefits and investments in research and development, expenditure 
on education, foreign aid and the fight against terrorism. There are still doubts 
about how the government will succeed to reduce costs, given that the 
unemployment rate reached 18% in 20093, one of the largest in the euro area, as it 
is the level of household indebtedness. 
Analysts expect the Spanish public debt as a percentage of GDP to be close to 
double in 2011 (74%) compared with 2008 (39.7%)4, increasing fears that the 
country could face financial problems similar to those of Greece and Portugal. 
Italy's economy has not been experiencing spectacular growth after 1999, annual 
average rate of real GDP being about 1.5%. Moreover, in 2009 it suffered the 
largest decline after the Second World War, while the budget deficit increased 
from 2.7% of GDP in 2008 to 5.3% of GDP in 2009. Inefficiencies from 
microeconomic level, applying a fiscal policy directed towards spending and the 
rapid growth of domestic wages (pressing toward the increase of unit labor costs) 
have affected the competitiveness and hence have generated inflationary pressure. 
In addition to these features, there is, also, a certain rigidity of the internal products 
market shown by the existence of price controls, administrative charges and the 
barriers imposed over ownership. Labor market is, also, one of the most rigid in the 
euro area. Italy's unsustainable fiscal policy and also the public debt are risk factors 
for the market perception of the Italian economy. There is a penalty risk from the 
market by increasing the risk premium regarding Italy's debt, which is one of the 
highest5 in the euro area, and growing6. Although public expenditure reached in 
                                                          
1
 AMECO Database. 
2
 In the previous estimate, the Spanish authorities forecasted a deficit of 8.1% of GDP in 2010, 5.2% 
of GDP in 2011 and only 3% of GDP in 2012. 
3
 AMECO Database. 
4
 According to the AMECO, in absolute terms, Spain's public debt was 570 billion in 2009, in 2011 
forecasts showing an increase to 792 billion. 
5
 1757 billion euros in 2009. 
6
 According to the European Commission (European Economic Forecast - Autumn 2009, European 
Economy 10/2009), public debt increased to 105.8% of GDP in 2008, to 114.6% of GDP in 2009 and 
will increase in 2011 to 117.8% of GDP. 
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2009 52.5% of GDP and the revenues have contracted, in crisis context both on 
direct and indirect taxes, in the next period it is expected the return of indirect tax 
revenues as the consumption will improve in 2010 and 2011. 
Data on economic development and those related to budget deficit are consistent 
with the analysts’ expectations, many of them considering that Italy has limited 
better than other GIPIS countries the recession impact on public finances. 
Euro adoption has boosted the consumption and the investment in Portugal’s 
economy by reducing (real) interest rates and liquidity constraints. Booming credit 
activity from the expansion period was based mainly on non-tradable sector and on 
the rigidity of labor and products markets, rigidity that hampered the process of 
real economic convergence. Poor performance of the economy in the aftermath of 
euro adoption can be explained by the fact that during the expansion it was not 
encouraged a strategy to increase productivity and competitiveness, and the 
conduct of fiscal policy has not helped to mitigate cyclical fluctuations. Primary 
budget expenditures increased significantly, mainly reflecting increased personnel 
costs. Fiscal policy has emphasized the fundamental imbalances, first by enhancing 
the expansion phenomenon (boom), led by domestic demand, and later, by limiting 
the possible reactions to the phenomenon of recession or economic downturn. If 
the booming growth in the late 1990s has allowed an improvement in government 
budget to facilitate euro adoption, after this moment, slowing economic activity 
revealed the vulnerability of Portugal's fiscal position. 
A sharp increase in the share of budget deficit to GDP occurred in 2009 compared 
to 2008 (to 8% from 2.8%1). The share of public debt to GDP was 77.4% in 20092. 
Fiscal slippages from 2009 reflect the severity of the strong economic downturn. 
For 2010 it is forecasted that the budget deficit will remain at the same level, with 
an increase in 2011. 
Portugal intends to adopt austerity measures designed to reduce the budget deficit 
from 8.3% in 2010 to 2.8% in 2013. The program is considered essential in order to 
convince the markets that Portugal will solve the budget deficit and debt issue and 
will not have problems like those in Greece. 
These measures include a comprehensive privatization plan for transport, energy, 
insurance or mail, which should limit the government's debt deepening. Under the 
government plan, public debt would reach 86% of GDP in 2010, and will increase 
                                                          
1
 AMECO Database. 
2
 AMECO Database. 
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by 2012 up to 90.7% of GDP, after that it will begin a slight decline in 2013, to 
89.8% of GDP. 
Before entering the euro area, Ireland had the highest economic growth rate in 
Europe, increase determined by the favorable perceptions of investors about the 
business environment in Ireland: lower cost of labor, communication easiness 
because of the English-speaking population, lower prices in the housing market and 
lower taxation. These factors, and also the prospects for European monetary 
integration have boosted economic growth and appreciated the national currency. 
After joining the EMU, until 2007, Ireland's economy continued to grow at 
accelerated rates, but it was affected by the loss of monetary independence, 
whereas the ECB has adjusted interest rates downwards to stimulate large 
economies facing a recession (Germany, France), having an adverse effect on 
countries that already had low interest rates (Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Greece). As a 
result, strong demand in Ireland has created upward pressure on prices and wages, 
eroding competitiveness. The particular evolution of the Irish economy is 
explained by the readjustment of the economy to shocks. Besides the interest rate 
initial shock (in 1998-2000) related to the euro zone entry, which was combined 
with a pro-cyclical fiscal loosening, the Irish economy was influenced by specific 
shocks of the euro area, caused by the differences between trading partners,  the 
structure of economic branches or the sectorial specialization. 
After the triggering of the global financial crisis, Ireland - the country that before 
this moment was considered a successful example of euro adoption - is in a great 
difficulty, showing the vulnerable elements of its development: the accumulation 
of debt, but also the inflow of foreign direct investment towards fragile sectors, 
particularly construction, in a period of real estate market expansion. The crisis, 
manifested aggressively in Ireland1, is not only economical, but also political. 
Given the harsh reactions that occur inside the country concerning the policy 
pursued by major European countries, exists the danger that Ireland to withdraw 
from the EMU, if it is not helped. Normally, the adoption of the euro means taking 
responsibility at both levels: by national political institutions and by those who 
make euro area policy. No policy change will indebt even more Ireland, whose 
                                                          
1
 The crisis in the real estate market has affected this country more severely than other European 
countries that have recorded expansion in this area. 
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public debt has reached in 2009 66% of GDP1. Since 2008, Ireland recorded a 
budget deficit whose share in GDP almost doubled in 2009 (12.5% vs. 7.2%)2. 
 
3. Some Implications for Romania 
In 2007, Romania has fulfilled the criterion on the budget deficit, but since 2008 
the budget deficit target, set at 2.3% of GDP, has been exceeded. According to the 
IMF, the government deficit in 2008 reflects: extremely optimistic forecasts on 
budget revenues, significant slippages of current spending (in particular with public 
sector wages and benefits) and, to a lesser extent, a sudden drop of revenues 
collected in the fourth quarter of 2008, due to economic slowdown, phenomenon 
which recorded an even more decreasing trend in 2009. The budget deficit from 
2009 was caused not so much by the crisis, but by the poor fiscal and budget 
execution. In other words, the increasing of budget deficit in 2009 is more the 
result of the crisis that we created and which is extending also in 2010. In the 
globalization, European integration and global financial and economic crisis 
context, the economic relations between Romania and EU countries, including 
those in the euro area, have widened, leading to multiple interdependencies, which 
have become the transmission channels for the problems of the partner countries. 
For Greece, the contagion effect on Romania can occur primarily through the 
financial channel, given the insignificant bilateral trade and that Greek banks 
(Bancpost Romanian Bank, Piraeus Bank Romania, Emporiki Bank, Alpha Bank, 
Romania ATEbank and Marfin Popular Bank) hold 20% of the Romanian banking 
market. A possible withdrawal of funds from subsidiaries in Central and Eastern 
Europe, therefore including Romania, would be justified by the need of increasing 
Greek deposits in a much faster manner than if the parent banks in Greece would 
resort to loans. Moreover, these banking institutions can get in a position to delay 
the credit process (already very hit by the crisis!) on the Romanian banking market 
and even in a position to stop granting new loans. However, the Romanian 
authorities consider that Greek banks are solid capitalized and the foreign reserves 
of the National Bank of Romania are an effective buffer against possible market 
volatility. 
                                                          
1
 AMECO Database. 
2
 AMECO Database. 
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As for Italy, with which Romania has extensive trade relations, the crisis may 
cause a reduction of our country's exports to this destination, and therefore can lead 
to Romania's economic downturn. 
The economic problems of Spain, Italy and Portugal may spread over Romania 
particularly through the labor channel (by reducing inflows of current transfers and 
income from work). 
In the context of the financial and economic global crisis and of the currently 
problems of the euro area, we believe that there are necessary prudent fiscal-
budgetary policies, under a balanced mix of macroeconomic policies. These, 
together with long-term reform programs, should correct the current imbalances 
and keep budget deficits under control. 
 
4. Conclusions 
With all its advantages, the euro area entails some risks. For example, Italy and 
Greece have entered into the monetary union with deficits higher than allowed by 
the Maastricht Treaty, and the governments of these countries have preferred to 
reduce deficits artificially, using financial instruments such as derivatives, rather 
than to increase taxes or cut spending.  
The problem of fiscal-budgetary imbalances of the GIPIS states can be translated 
not only into a  bad management of external debt, but especially into a problem of 
asymmetric shocks manifestation, thing that has always been known as being a 
problem and which deepened in the current crisis context. 
The results registered over the years by the euro area countries show that a 
politically forced membership, of those countries that are not yet economically 
prepared to face, on long term, the rigorous and super-regulated euro area climate, 
determines major disturbance in the functioning of their economies, and also in the 
euro area. 
Therefore, the GIPIS countries’ deficit and debt issue is a significant challenge for 
the economic unity and for the European currency stability within the euro area and 
the EU, as a whole. 
The above analysis shows that even under the euro “umbrella” a country’s 
economy is not safe as long as its structure is not appropriate for a long-term 
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sustainable development, if that economy is perceived by the investors as being 
risky. 
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